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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS FOR SUBSURFACE EXCAVATION:
MISREPRESENTATION AND CHANGE OF CONDITIONS
Throughout the current century, federal, state and local governments have
engaged the services of private construction companies in an increasing
number of governmental construction projects. Many of these projects,
such as the construction of roads, tunnels, dams, bridges, and buildings,
require, at least to some degree, subsurface excavation. This comment deals
with some of the legal problems facing contractors and governmental
agencies in such excavation, and suggests possible solutions to these problems.
When a governmental agency has received proper authorization to pro-
ceed with the construction of a project, according to law it advertises for
contractors to submit proposals.' The proposals by the contractors, if made
in accordance with the law or agency rules, are submitted to the agency
for approval. The successful bidder is subsequently awarded the contract
and begins construction pursuant to the contract.
In 1918, the Supreme Court stated, as a basic rule of contract law, that
when one agrees to do a thing possible of performance, "he will not be
excused or become entitled to additional compensation, because unforeseen
difficulties are encountered." 3 Although this general rule may preclude
recovery by the unfortunate contractor who discovers conditions different
from those anticipated, in numerous cases involving subsurface construc-
tion and excavation, contractors have brought successful actions against
the governmental agency involved when the situation actually encountered
differed from that which was thought to exist.4
When the contractor has discovered that conditions differ from those
anticipated, he is bound nevertheless to complete the project even if doing
so causes him increased expense and greater difficulty than he had antici-
pated.5 When this situation arises, he has two avenues of pursuit that he
can utilize to recover his losses-an action for breach of implied warranty
or misrepresentation, and an action based upon a change of condition clause
within the contract.
1 E.g, VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-185 (1970).
2 E.g., VA. DEPr. OF Hwys. ROAD AND BRIDGE SPECImCAIONS § 102.05 (1970).
3 United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918).
4 United States v. Smith, 256 U.S. 11 (1921); United States v. Atlantic Dredging Co.,
253 U.S. 1 (1920); Christie v. United States, 237 U.S. 234 (1915); Hollerbach v. United
States, 233 U.S. 165 (1914); Wunderlich v. State, 65 Cal. 2d 777, 423 P.2d 545, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 473 (1967); Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Commission of Pub. Works, 284 S.C. 84, 149
S.E.2d 55 (1966).
G United States v. Spearin, 284 U.S. 132 (1918).
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MISREPRESENTATION
In order for a contractor to be successful in an action for misrepresenta-
tion, he must be misled, at least to some degree, by the governmental agency.
In a leading case, Peter Salzucci & Sons, Inc. v. State,6 the court stated that
one who has contracted to do a thing for a stated price will not be entitled
to extra compensation because he has encountered difficulties that have not
been provided for in the contract.7 Recognizing a qualification of this
general rule, however, the court noted:
A contractor of public works who, acting reasonably, is misled by
incorrect plans and specifications issued by the public authorities as
the basis for bids and who, as a result, submits a bid which is lower
than he would have otherwise made may recover in a contract action
for extra work or expenses necessitated by the conditions being other
than as represented.8
Thus, a contractor has some basis for recovery when faced with a misrepre-
sentation that has adversely affected the project.
An early case, Christie v. United States,9 indicated five elements necessary
to maintain an action for misrepresentation." ° The first is that a material
fact be represented. There are several ways in which the governmental
agency can make representations to the contractor: actual assertions in-
cluded in the contract,' a design of the project indicating the presence of
a certain subsurface condition, 12 and diagrams indicating that certain con-
ditions exist.13 The second element requires that the representation made
6 110 N.H. 136, 268 A.2d 899 (1970).
lId. at -, 268 A.2d at 906; see SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 180 (1965).
8 110 N.H. at -, 268 A.2d at 907.
9 237 U.S. 234 at 241 (1915).
10 Although the Court in Christie does not actually list the elements as such, the five
necessary elements are easily discernible from the opinion.
11See, e.g., Hollerbach v. United States, 233 US. 165 (1914); E. H. Morrill Co. v.
State, 65 Cal. 2d 787, 423 P.2d 551, 56 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1967).
12 Usually the design of the project is incorporated into the contract. Because the
parties are unaware of subsurface conditions, the design adopted by the governmental
agency may be inadequate, and such design could be construed as representing a sub-
surface condition that does not exist. E.g., City of Richmond v. I. J. Smith & Co., 119
Va. 198, 89 S.E. 123 (1916).
23 Diagrams and drawings, such as those depicting cross sections of terrain through
which the contractor is to excavate, may be available to the bidders. These diagrams
and drawings may indicate the presence of subsurface conditions that do not exist, such
as the location of solid rock or other material likely to affect subsurface excavation.
When the contractor relies upon such diagrams and drawings to determine his bid, such
could be construed as a misrepresentation of subsurface conditions. See Annot., 76 A.L.R.
268 at 275 (1932).
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by the state be false. If the agency actually has knowledge that a certain
condition exists and withholds such information, this requirement is ful-
filled.14 In fact, if the governmental agency has made a misrepresentation
to the contractor, whether intentional or not, the requirement is satisfied.15
The third and fourth requirements state that the contractor must have
relied upon the misrepresentation and suffered injury as a result. The last
and most important element, that this reliance be justified, 16 is determined
by a combination of factors. It must be determined whether the repre-
sentation made by the governmental agency constituted a positive assertion
or a mere suggestion..7 If the governmental agency makes a "positive and
material representation as to a condition presumably within the knowledge
of the Government, and upon which.., the plaintiff had a right to rely," 18
the agency is considered to have warranted such a condition, despite a
general provision requiring an on-site inspection by the contractors. 9 If,
however, statements made in good faith could be considered as suggestive
only, expenses caused by unforeseen conditions will remain on the contractor,
especially if the contract so stipulates.20
In C. W. Blakeslee & Sons v. United States,2' the court held that the
language was merely suggestive where the government informed the con-
tractor that the material to be removed was "believed to be mostly sand
with large and small boulders, and gravel," 22 While most courts would
concur and have no difficulty determining that such language was merely
suggestive, other courts deciding cases in which the governmental agency
apparently made a positive statement have held that such statements were
merely suggestive.23
14 United States v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 253 U.S. 1 (1920); Christie v. United States,
237 U.S. 234 (1915); Port Dist. v. Palmberg, 280 F.2d 237 (9th Cit. 1960); Robert E.
Lee & Co. v. Commissioner of Pub. Works, 249 S.C. 84, 149 S.E.2d 55 (1966).
1 In Christie, the government's engineer knew about logs buried in the excavation
area but failed to mention them in his report, causing the contractor's bid to be inaccu-
rate. The Court stated:
It makes no difference to the legal aspects of 'the case that the omissions from
the records of the results of the borings did not have sinister purpose. There were
representations made which were relied upon by Claimants and properly relied
upon by them, as they were positive. 237 U.S. at 242.
See also Kiely Constr. Co. v. State, 154 Mont. 363, 463 P.2d 888 (1970).
16Wunderlich v. State, 65 Cal. 2d 777, 423 P.2d 545, 56 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1967).
17 Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U.S. 165 (1914).
18 Id. at 169.
19 Hollerbach v. United States, 223 U.S. 165 (1914).
2
°Wunderlich v. State, 65 Cal. 2d 777, 423 P.2d 545, 56 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1967).
2189 Cr. Cl. 226 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 659 (1940).
22 Id. at 229.
2 3 E.g., J. A. Thompson & Son v. State, 51 Hawaii 529, 465T.2d 148 (1970).
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Another factor considered in determining if a contractor's reliance has
been justified is whether the representation made by the governmental
agency was within its knowledge. In Peter Salvucci & Sons, Inc. v. State,24
the agency represented that the contractor could obtain a necessary material
from a specific source; however, once the agency accepted his bid, the
contractor was not able to obtain the material. Clearly, the agency should
have known whether the material was available.2 5 Similarly, in Hollerbach
v. United States,26 the plaintiff contractor was awarded a contract to con-
struct a dam for the federal government. The government represented that
the dam was then backed with broken stone, sawdust and sediment, when,
in fact, it was not, as subsequent excavation revealed.27 The Court noted
that this was a representation of a fact "concerning which the government
may be presumed to speak with knowledge and authority." 28
Additionally, some authority exists that has placed the burden of knowl-
edge and expertise in the field of subterranean excavation upon the con-
tractor when the government agency had represented that certain condi-
tions existed.2 9 For example, when the government represented that an
excavation was primarily through lava rock, the contractor was charged
with the knowledge that the character of this material through which he
was to excavate could vary drastically within a short distance.50
Usually, when a governmental agency decides to undertake a project
involving some type of excavation, it will make test borings to ascertain
the type of subsurface material that the contractor may expect to encounter.
Such borings, along with any other information the government may have,
are usually made available to the prospective bidders. As a result, a question
arises whether a warranty, if any, will attach to this information. Clearly,
where the government has indicated that it has made test borings to a
certain depth, and the plaintiff has based his bid upon such alleged test
results that subsequently prove to be incorrect, the government will be liable
24 110 N.H. 136, 268 A.2d 899 (1970).
25In Salvucci the commissioner of highways had notified the contractor by telegram
that "free gravel and borrow could be obtained from the National Forest lands through
which the highways were to be built." Id. at -, 268 A.2d at 901. Although a repre-
sentative of the state government made the statement, a federal agency refused to allow
the use of the material. Clearly the state should have made the necessary inquiries before
making such a statement.
26223 U.S. 165 (1914).
27 The dam to be repaired was owned by the United States government. One should
reasonably be able to rely upon a statement made by the government concerning the
subsurface backing of a dam which it built.
28 Hollerbach v. United States, 223 U.S. 165, at 172 (1914).
29 J. A. Thompson & Son v. State, 51 Hawaii 529, 465 P.2d 148 (1970).
sold. at 538, 465 P.2d at 154.
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if, in fact, no test borings were ever made.31 However, the problem becomes
more difficult when the agency has conducted test borings and accurately
reported the results, but the contractor thereafter discovers that the test
borings, although accurate, are not indicative of the total area to be exca-
vated.32 In Chris Nelsen & Son v. City of Monroe,3 3 the plaintiff contractor
brought an action in assumpsit, alleging that the defendant city furnished
him with faulty and incorrect information. The contractor was unable to
show that the borings made by the city were incorrect. Here, the city
disclosed all the information at its disposal to the contractor and allowed
him to draw his own conclusions. The court, in holding for the city, noted
that when true and accurate results of the test borings are given to a con-
tractor, a city will not be liable for any incorrect conclusions that the
contractor may draw from such information.3 4
Even if the government itself forms a conclusion concerning the subter-
ranean conditions and makes all of its borings and test results available to a
contractor, the contractor is charged with knowledge that the test borings
are determinative only of the precise location of the hole.as Thus, when a
governmental agency makes its boring results available to a bidder, the latter
is charged with the knowledge that the borings are not conclusive and are
"merely indications, . . .from which deductions might be drawn as to
actual conditions." 36
In general, the only warranty or guarantee that is made by the govern-
mental agency, in cases decided in favor of governmental agencies, is that
the borings and other tests were made and conducted by approved methods,
and were accurately reported.37
31 Kiely Constr. Co. v. State, 154 Mont. 363, 463 P.2d 888 (1970).32 Elkan v. Sebastian Bridge Dist., 291 F. 532 (8th Cir. 1923).
83 337 Mich. 438, 60 N.W.2d 182 (1953).
34 Id. at 446, 60 N.W.2d at 186; see also Warner Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
2 Cal. 3d 285, 466 P.2d 996, 85 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1970).
35 J. A. Thompson & Son v. State, 51 Hawaii 529, 465 P.2d 148 (1970).
36 Elkan v. Sebastian Bridge Dist., 291 F. 532, 538 (8th Cir. 1923).
37 In Wunderlich, the court referred to Chris Nelsen & Son v. City of Monroe, 337
Mich. 438, 60 N.W.2d 182 (1953), stating that the implied warranty made by the de-
fendant city applied only to the accuracy of the test made by the city. There are
numerous other cases that have held in favor of the contractor when the results of the
test given to him by the governmental agency were inaccurate. In Warner Constr. Co.
v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 285, 466 P.2d 966, 85 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1970), the court,
referring to Wunderlich and Nelsen, stated that "the bidder takes the risk in making
deductions from accurate test data, but the city retains responsibility for any inaccuracy
in the data:' Id. at -, 466 P.2d at 1000, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 448. In cases such as Christie v.
United States, 237 U.S. 234 (1915) (where the report was inaccurate due to a with-
holding of information by the government), United States v. Atlantic Dredging Co,
253 US. 1 (1920) (where the test had been conducted in an unreliable manner), or
Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Comm'n of Pub. Works, 248 S.C. 84, 149 S.E.2d 55 (1966)
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Furthermore, although the government will conduct test borings, it wills
often require the contractor to inspect the site and conduct his own test-
to satisfy himself that he has knowledge of the subsurface conditions that.
he will encounter. 38 Apparently, the purpose of this requirement is to pre-
vent a contractor from claiming that he had relied upon the test borings
of the governmental agency when he prepared his bid. Usually, however,,
such an effort by the government will not relieve it of liability if the bidder
is not given ample time to perform his own test. Peter Salvucci & SonsaR
exemplifies this situation; the court, referring to a number of cases held:
Where bidder is allowed insufficient time within which to make a.
personal study, the State cannot invoke the general exculpatory clauses.
to exonerate itself from liability. Particularly is this true in a case ...
where no specific warning is given in connection with the particular
item the representation of which is in question; or in a situation ...
where the bidder has not time to make a personal and detailed in-'
spection.40
The question of what constitutes a sufficient period of time for such an:
independent investigation will obviously vary with the circumstances of.
the particular case, but when the government has spent months and even
years conducting tests at the proposed construction site, clearly a few days
or weeks is not sufficient time for the contractor to conduct his test.4'
The effect of a disclaimer or other exculpatory language incorporated
into the contract is another important element of justified reliance. 42 The
government may include a valid disclaimer regarding test conclusions, but
this has no effect when the government has been negligent in conducting
(where the reports of the government did not accurately reveal the results of the test
boring), the courts have held for the contractor. From the foregoing as well as other
cases one can conclude that a governmental agency will be liable for inaccurately re-
porting test results to a contractor. See also, Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. Superior
Court, 57 Cal. 2d 508, 370 P.2d 338, 20 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1962); 43 Am. JtnR. Public Works
Contracts, § 111 (1962). However, where the test results are accurately reported and the
contractor can draw his own conclusions therefrom, the agency will not be liable.
38 VA. DEpT. OF Hwys. RoAD AND BRIDGE SPECUFICAIONS § 102.04 (1970).
39 110 N.H. 136, 268 A.2d 899 (1970).
40d. at -, 268 A.2d at 906.
41 In Haggart Constr. Co. v. State, 149 Mont. 442, 427 P.2d 686 (1967), although the
state gave the contractor the opportunity to bid nineteen days before the deadline, it
furnished the necessary information, which was incorrect, only fourteen days before the
deadline. One of the reasons for which the court allowed recovery was that the con-
tractor himself did not have sufficient time to perform an investigation.
42In Wunderlich v. State, 65 Cal. 2d 777, 423 P.2d 545, 56 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1970), th
court indicated that a pertinent disclaimer is an element necessary to reli~v the gov,
eminent of its liability. Id. at -, 423 P.2d at 550, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
COMMENTS
its test borings. In Haggart Construction Co. v. State,43 a case in which the
governmental agency was negligent in making its tests, the court held for
the plaintiff and refused to allow the government to utilize exculpatory
language in the contract to escape liability for its misleading statement.44
General exculpatory language is usually insufficient to relieve the govern-
ment of any liability. In E. H. Morrill Co. v. State,45 the contract stated
that the contractor would receive no additional compensation for difficulties
caused by surface and subsurface conditions.4 6 Although such language
appears to be strong and fairly specific, the court would not allow the
government to be relieved from its liability. Likewise, after a thorough
examination of the pertinent law the court in Wunderlich v. State4' said:
When there is no misrepresentation of factual matters within the state's
knowledge or withholding of material information, and when both
parties have equal access to information as to the nature of the test
which resulted in the state's findings, the contractor may not claim in
the face of a pertinent disclaimer that the presentation of the infor-
mation, or a reasonable summary thereof, amounts to a warranty of
the conditions that will actually be found.48
Thus, it appears that if the government uses language that is merely sug-
gestive, is not negligent in making or reporting its test, makes no misrepre-
sentation of a matter presumably within its knowledge, and utilizes an
appropriate disclaimer, the contractor will not be successful in an action
of misrepresentation against the government. By following the appropriate
procedure from the outset of the bidding, the government clearly can
protect itself from liability resulting from any unforeseen conditions. Be-
cause of this, the contractor should be aware of his responsibility to com-
plete the project regardless of any change in condition that may occur,
and as a result, would have to raise his bid higher than ordinarily necessary
in order to compensate for any possible obstacle that may arise. Thus, the
ideal solution would seem to be for the parties to include a change of con-
ditions clause in the contract.
43 149 Mont. 422, 427 P.2d 686 (1967).
44 Id. at 428, 427 P.2d at 687-88.
45 65 Cal. 2d 787, 423 P.2d 551, 56 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1967).
41 In the Morrill case the governmental agency used an exculpatory clause which
stated that,
[the contractor] shall receive no additional compensation for any obstacles or
difficulties due to surface or subsurface conditions actually encountered. Id. at
789, 423 P.2d at 553, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
47 65 Cal. 2d 787, 423 P.2d 545, 56 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1967).
48 Id. at -, 423 P.2d at 550, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
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CHANGE OF CONDITIONS
Some contracts do include a change of conditions clause,49 and a number
of cases have been brought by contractors to recover their losses due to
conditions being other than those thought to exist at the outset of the con-
tract.50 In City of Richmond v. I. 1. Smith & Co., Inc.,51 the actions of mis-
representation and change of circumstance were so intermingled and closely
related that it was difficult to distingush the two. The city represented that
there was hard rock only a few feet below the river bottom suitable for a
bridge foundation. Upon excavation of the site, the contractor found that
the rock was considerably deeper than the drawings indicated. Although
he mentioned the elements necessary to sustain such an action for misrepre-
sentation, he brought his action on the ground that the conditions actually
encountered were substantially different from those contemplated by the
parties. Recovery for changed conditions was allowed by the court because
the contractor was entitled to such, by virtue of the change of conditions
clause within the contract.5 2
Generally, such a clause allows the parties to renegotiate the amount
of money to be paid to the contractor, and upon what basis it is to be paid
when he encounters a change of conditions. The primary purpose of the
clause seems to be to enable the government to change the design of the
project, and still hold the contractor to his obligation, when conditions not
anticipated occur that render the original plans and designs inadequate.
Contractors, however, have been able to use such clauses to their benefit
when conditions encountered have differed materially from those antici-
pated, although the plans and designs remained adequate. 3
In addition to an actual change of conditions, to maintain such an action,
doubtless such a clause must be included in the contract. Without such a
clause and without actionable misrepresentation by the governmental agency,
the unfortunate contractor is bound to complete the project as long as its
completion is possible.54
49 For an example of a change of conditions clause, see Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 211 n.4
(1962).
BOSee, e.g., Woodcrest Constr. Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 406 (Ct. Cl. 1969);
Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 817 (Ct. Cl. 1957); John A. Johnson
Contracting Corp. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. (Ct. Cl. 1955).
51 119 Va. 198, 89 S.E. 123 (1916).
52In this case the court stated that the contractor had complied with the clause in
the contract that provided for additional compensation when extra work was necessary.
Id. at 207, 89 S.E. at 126.
53 See note 52 supra.
54 As stated in the general rule, as long as the contract can possibly be performed,
the contractor is liable for full performance, regardless of difficulties he may incur. See
United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918).
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CONCLUSION
There is no question that a governmental agency can successfully disclaim
any liability when the contractor's bid is insufficient to cover the cost aiid
profit of a governmental construction project, except when the agency-hs
been negligent. Knowing this, a prospective bidder will reflect in his pro-
posal every possible change in circumstance that could arise, resulting in a
substantially higher bid. 55 However, there appears to be a solution that
could, at least to some extent, resolve this dilemma. The governmental
agency should follow the appropriate procedure to insure that it will be
protected from an action by the contractor for misrepresentation. Also, the
parties should include a change of circumstances clause in the contract.
Such clause should not be of a general nature, such as those that appear in
agency regulations and that are incorporated in all agency projects by
reference,50 but should be drafted separately and specifically for each indi-
vidual project, mindful of the changes of circumstances likely to be in-
curred. The primary purpose for such a clause should not be to allow the
government to change its inadequate design, but rather to compensate the
contractor for his increased costs resulting from unanticipated conditions.
The clause should prescribe the method under which the contractor is to
proceed, whether on a cost basis, a force account basis, or some other
method amenable to the parties.
One major question that could conceivably arise with great regularity
concerns who should determine when a change of conditions has actually
occurred.57 Clearly, the government's consultant engineers would be hesi-
tant to declare that a change of conditions exist; conversely, the contractor's
consultant engineers would be anxious to make such a determination. The
logical solution seems to be to provide for the contractor to make his
change of conditions claim, and if the government refuses to recognize the
claim, the parties agree to submit to arbitration in some form. 58 The pur-
pose of recommending this procedure that appears to allow the contractor
an escape route when he bids too low is not to encourage careless bids,
5 See Haggart Constr. Co. v. State, 149 Mont. 422, 428, 427 P.2d 686, 687-88 (1967).
56 VA. DFPr. OF Hwys. RoAD AND BmDGE SPECIFICATIONS § 104.02 (1970).
57 The actual determination of the time that a change of condition occurs is a very
important factor. Often when the contractor feels that a change has occurred and the
representative of the government feels that it has not, the contractor will refuse to
perform. As a result of the delay in construction, large sums of money may be-lost
and the project may be delayed unnecessarily. • t
5&Some states may prohibit the settlement of government "contract, disputes by a4bi-
tration; however, that is beyond the scope of this comment. Arbitration is merely
suggested as a possible solution to this problem.
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as some authorities fear,59 but rather to encourage the contractor to bid
reasonably, knowing that should a condition occur, not in the contempla-
tion of the parties at the outset of the project, he will at least be able to
recover his costs.
.H.J.
59 In J. A. Thompson & Son v. State, 51 Hawaii 529, 465 P.2d 148 (1970), the court
stated that "the State should not be placed in the position of encouraging careless bids
by contractors who might anticipate that should conditions differ from optimistic ex-
ectations reflected in the bids, the State would bear the cost of the bidder's error." Id.
at 539, 465 P.2d at 155.
